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GLISSMAN v. EKLOF MARINE CORP.
United States District Court, Eastern District New York
No. 85 CV 4339, 1989 WL 88058 (E.D. N.Y.)
28 July 1989
One may be considered an employer for the purposes of the Jones Act if it orders, instructs or otherwise exerts control
over the seaman. One who exerts possession and control over a vessel may be liable for claims of unseaworthiness
irrespective of lack of ownership.
FACTS: In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that he suflered in
juries while employed by the defendant EklofMarine Corporation
<"Eklof'l, as a seaman on Barge E-17. Plaintiff argues that the
injuries were caused by the defendant's negligence and the
unseaworthiness of the vessel. Eklof contended that the
plaintiff cannot maintain an action against it under the Jones
Act because it is not the plaintiffs employer: and that no claim
of unseaworthiness lies because it does not own the barge.
The defendant maintained that the A & C Ship Fueling Corpo
ration I "A & C"l employed the plaintiff. Eklof produced 1983
and 1984 W -2 income tax forms issued by A & C to the plaintiff.
Eklof also asserted that A & C owns the E-17 and offered an
inspection certificate issued by the United States Coast Guard
indicating that A & C is the owner. Eklof did not produce a
certificate of title.
The plaintiff maintained that Elkof was his employer, offering
his pension fund statements from New York Marine Towing
and Transportation Industry Pension Fund !"Marine Towing" I
listing Eklof as the plaintiffs employer. Plaintiff also produced
union dues receipts issued byMarine Towing designating Eklof
as employer. Plaintiff also asserted that all his orders and duties
pertaining to the E-17 were given byMr. Eklof, head dispatcher
for the defendant. Eklof did not dispute this fact.
In support of his contention that the defendant owns the E-17,
plaintiff submitted as evidence a violation from the Coast
Guard issued in January 1986, ltwo years after his injuries!
indicating that Eklof owns the E-17.

ANALYSIS: An action brought under the Jones Act, 46
U.S.C. §688 may only be brought by a seaman against his
employer. Karvolis v. Constellation Lines, SA., 806 F.2d 49, 52
( 2d Cir. 1986) In order to determine who is a seaman's employer,a
court must look to "the plain and rational meaning of employment
and emplo.Yer'." Mahramas v. AmericanExportls b randsten Lines,
Inc., 475 F.2d 165, 171 <2d Cir. 1973), ( quoting Cosmopolitan
Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 791 (19491 1.
Tlie court must also consider who exercises control over the
seaman and who instructs the seaman as to his duties and
obligations of the vessel. This court cited with approval the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Guidry v. South Louisiana Contractors,
Inc., 614 F.2d 447, 452 (5th Cir. 19801, that held that an entity
that borrows a worker may become his employer for purposes of
a claim under the Jones Act if that employer exerts control over
the worker.
The court believed that the plaintiff produced sufficient evi
dence to create a jury question as to whether Eklof controlled
him, and therefore denied defendant's Jones Act motions.
On the claim of unseaworthiness the court noted that case law
makes it clear that it is not necessary that a defendant have title
to or be the record owner of the vessel to be held liable. Karvolis
v. Constellation Lines, S.A., supra. One who operates, manages
or charters a vessel exercises such control and possession of the
vessel to be its owner pro hac vice. Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S.
410,412-413 ( 1963).
Although the court was faced with conflicting Coast Guard
documents of ownership of the E-17 the court found a material
question of fact as to whether Eklof di d possess and control the E-17
so as to be considered the owner pro hac vice. The defendant's
motion for summary judgment on the claim of unseaworthiness
was therefore denied.

ISSUES: 11 I Does a question of fact exist in this case as to who
the plaintiffs employer was for purposes of the Jones Act?
<21 May a claim of unseaworthiness be asserted
against a party in possession and control of a vessel, or only
against an owner?

B.J. Calamari '92

KUEHNE & NAGEL <AG & CO.) v. GEOSOURCE, INC.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 5 June 1989
874 F.2d 283
Admiralty jurisdiction does not exist for a claim of breach of a contract to transport goods on through bills of lading over
land and sea, as this is not a contract for a traditional maritime activity. There is no admiralty jurisdiction for a claim for
the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation unless the Executive Jet requirements are met.
FACTS: The action involved a cargo shipment that became
stranded in Turkey during its journey from Western Europe to
the Middle East. The parties to the action include the three
freight forwarders - Kuehne & Nagel 1AG & Co.l !''Kuehne &
Nagel'"l, Panalpina Welttransport Gmbh i''Panalpina"l, and
SGS Control! Co., mbH i''SGS"i, who made an agreement with
Geosource, Inc. 1''Geosource" I, a Houston based company which
owned all of Geosource Co., and also owned one-half of Ucamar
Shipping & Transportation 1Cayman1 Ltd. 1"Ucamar"1, and,
Ristram Seetransport Management Gmbh 1Ristram 1Germany11
1 ''Ristram 1 which owned the other half of Ucamar, to ship
cargo. The parties intended to form a consolidated shipping line
under the auspices of Ucamar.
To facilitate this goal and obtain business from European
freight forwarders, a promotional meeting was sponsored by
Geosource tor Ucamar in November 198:.:!. After the presentations
were made, the three freight forwarders contracted with
Geosource to ship cargo on Ucamar's through bills of lading.
The commercial advantage which Ucamar possessed enabling
it to attract customers was its ability to draw upon the combined
expertise of Geosource and Ristram which covered both segments
..

of the targeted route. Ristram contracted to provide Ucamar
with licenses,stevedoring services and facilities to receive cargo
m Turkey. Ucamar was to obtain bills of lading for the cargo to
be transported and utilize local contracts to guarantee delivery
to Iran via overland shipment from Turkey.
The forwarders· cargo was loaded in late 1982 but while in port in
Turkey inMarch 1983, Ucamar was unable to unload some of the
cargo and clearance through Turkish customs severely-delayed
the initial deliveries. Each party involved blamed the other for
the difliculties which ensued and the end result was a breakdown
of the entire arrangement.
Whether the plaintiff' has a cause of action in admiralty
based upon the maritime tort offraudulent inducement to contract
and a cause of action for breach of a maritime contract based upon
the through bills of lading?
ISSUE:

ANALYSIS: The district court decided that admiralty juris
diction did exist for the question of fraudulent inducement to
contract. The court based its opinion on the two pronged test of
(Continued ...)
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consequences never happened and therefore the situs require
ment of Executive Jet was not met, thereby invalidating any
claim for admiralty jurisdiction. The court of appeals held that
the parties to a contract with strong maritime ties must satisfy
the Executive Jet situs requirment.
As to the claim for breach of a maritime contract, the district
court found that Kuehne & Nagel could not invoke admiraltv
jurisdiction based on breach of contract. The first and foremost
criterion to be fulfilled is the existence of a maritime contract.
Rea v. The Eclipse, 135 U.S. 599 ( 19801. A traditional maritime
contract does not include land transportation. Elements which
establish a maritime contract are activities that are traditionally
marine in nature with only incidental non-maritime activity
being permissible. If there is a mix of elements, the admiralty
court must separate the activities and enforce the maritime
obligations. The bills of lading had a fixed single rate for the sea
and land transportation.
The Fifth Circuit agreed and affirmed the district courts find
ing that there was no admiralty jurisdiction based on breach of a
maritime contract. In this contract, neither of the requirements
are met. Although the situation did involve transportation of
goods by sea, the route included a 1000 mile overland road trip
which is not an incidental portion of the contract or something
easily separable.

Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 409 U.S.
249 (1972). Executive Jet provided the test to be satisfied when

invoking admiralty jurisdiction for maritime torts and requires
that: (1) the alleged wrong occurs on navigable waters \situsl
and (2) the wrong bears a significant relationship to traditional
maritime activities \nexus).
The district court found that the "impact" of the fraudulent
contract "took effect" on navigable waters because the delays in
unloading the cargo allowed the remaining cargo to be " at se�"
waiting to be discharged. The requirement of Executwe Jet tor
situs was provided with the linkage by the delay at sea.ln effect,
the misrepresentations were manifested at sea. Carroll v. Pro
tection Maritime Insurance Co., Ltd., 5 12 F.2d 4 ! 1st C1r. 19751.
The district court found that the intentional tort was so " .. .
interwoven with a maritime contractual relationship !at least
in part) as to fall within admiralty jurisdiction.' " Kuehne &
Nagel (AG & CO) v. Geosource, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 794, 799 n.6
(S.D. Tex. 1986). The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court
and found no basis for admiralty jurisdiction. In the instant case,
the fraudulent inducement took place at the forwarders' meeting
in Hamburg, FRG. The tortious acts occurred before the contract
was signed. An "impact" on navigable waters w1th mant1me
·
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E.A.S. T., INC. OF STAMFORD, CONN. v. M/V ALAIA
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 26 June 1989
8 76 F.2d 1168
Breach of a time charter creates a maritime lien distinct from liens based on contracts of affreightment and requires
delivery of the vessel rather than the union of ship and cargo to become effective.

as a suflicient basis for referring parties to arbitration?

FACTS: E.A.S.T., Inc. ("EAST"l entered into an agreement
with Advance Co. ("Advance") the owners of the M/V Alaia, to
time charter the vessel. The charter party acknowledged
EAST's intention to carry milk carton stock and bulk soda ash
from New Orleans to Venezuela. Also, the charter agreement
contained an arbitration clause that specified that this contract
would be arbitrated in London and governed by English law.
EAST subsequently entered into two voyage subcharters, one to
carr_y milk carton stock and another to carry soda ash. EAST
paid $26,700 in advance charter hire. EAST procured ship's
agents, longshoremen, bunkers, and encountered other ex
penses in preparation for the charter. The vessel went "on hire"
on October 20, 1987. EAST and the two subcharters engaged
marine surveyors to inspect the vessel. The marine surveyors
concluded that the vessel was unseaworthy, was not suitable to
carry the cargo and did not meet the standards of the charter
party. The surveyors cited excessive dirt, rust and debris along
with unseaworthy hatches as the basis for their finding.
EAST rejected the vessel and filed an in rem action in Federal
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, where it
sought to invoke the charter's arbitration clause and obtain
security for a possible arbitration award. Advance filed a notice
of appearance in personam, an answer and a counter-claim.
Advance sought to vacate the vessel's arrest order, claiming
that the maritime lien was insufficiently based, and alleging
that a valid charter party had come into existence. Alternatively,
Advance stated a maritime lien is improper for breach of a
charter party, where cargo had not been loaded on the ship.
Advance also contested EAST's claim that the arbitration
clause was not enforceable.
The district court first rejected the argument that a valid time
charter did not exist. This court, relying on the reasoning of

ANALYSIS: The Fifth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the dis
trict court, and concluded that the time charter between the
parties was not executory because the vessel had been delivered
to EAST. The court cited, G. Gilmore and C. Black, The Law of
Admiralty 636 (2d ed. 1975!, which states, "ltJhe point at which
the vessel itself is deemed to have commenced 'performance'
sufficient to remove the contract from executory status varies
with the �pe of contract involved." The court of appeals further
cited G. Gil more and C. Black, supra at 636, "lu]nder charter
parties, the point of 'execution' would be the delivery of the
vessel under the charter: mere refusal to deliver would only give
rise to liability in personam... . "
The court of appeals rejected the assertion by Advance, that
the time charter was a contract of affreightment and therefore
remained executory until there was a union of the ship and its
cargo. The court distinguished Belvedere v. Campania Plomari
de Vapores, SA., 189 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1951!, which Advance
claimed controlled the issue, on the grounds that the plaintiff
was both a cargo owner and a charterer. The EAST court stated
"l w ]hen, however,the charterer has, as in this case, entered into
subcharters with the cargo owners, the charterer asserts a
breach only of the time charter qua time charter and not of a
contract of affreightment. . .." EA.S.T., at 1177. The court of
appeals affirmed the district court's decision granting a
maritime lien upon the breach of time charter.
The Fifth Circuit also agreed with the district court that in rem
jurisdiction is an adequate basis for referring parties to arbitration.
The court of appeals found the Federal Arbitration Act §8 to be
persuas1ve:
1f the basis of jurisdiction be a cause of action otherwise
justiciable in admiralty, then . . . the party claiming to be
aggrieved may begin his proceeding hereunder by libel
and seizure of the vessel or other property of the other
party according to the usual course of admiralty proceed
mgs, and the court shall then have jurisdiction to direct
the parties to proceed wth the arbitration and shall retain
jurisdiction to enter its decree upon the award.
9 U.S.C. §8
Even in the absence of this provision,9 U.S.C. §206 authorizes
the district court to refer the parties to arbitration in London as
provided for in the charter party. The court further agreed that
Advance's appearance in personam was a separate and sufficient
basis on which to refer parties to arbitration.

International Marine Towing v. Southern Leasing Partners, Ltd.,
722 F.2d 126 \5th Cir, 19831, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 82 1 ( 19841,

noted that a martime lien was valid even though no cargo was
loaded pursuant to the charter. The court also held that the
enforcement of the arbitration clause based on i '' ··em jurisdiction
was sufficient and that any defect in jurisdictwn was cured by
Advance's appearance in personam to defend against EAST's
action and to support its counterclaim.

ISSUES: ! ll Did the trial court err in concluding that a
maritime lien was proper for breach of a time charter even
though cargo had never been loaded or placed in the possession
of the vessel?
( 2 l Did the trial court err in finding in rem jurisdiction

Edward F. Kenny '90
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